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MASSACHUSETTS LAW-THE SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT Doc
TRINE EXPANDS BEYOND LIFE-PROLONGING DECISIONs-In re

Guardianship ofRoe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision; In re
Guardianship of Roe, I significantly narrowed the scope of a guard
ian's authority over his mentally ill ward. The central issue 2 was
whether the guardian of a mentally ill, 3 noninstitutionalized 4 ward
possessed the inherent authority under the Massachusetts Guardian
ship statute 5 to consent to the forcible administration 6 of antip
sychotic medication 7 in the absence of an emergency and against the
wishes of the ward. s The court developed a set of guidelines which
I. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 421 N.E.2d 40.
2. Id. at 983, 421 N.E.2d at 42. On the collateral issue of the standard of proof in a
permanent or temporary guardianship proceeding, the coun held that a permanent
guardian may be appointed upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that an indi
vidual is unable to care for himself by reason of mental illness and a temporary guardian
be appointed upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the welfare of the
mentally ill person requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian. Id. at
993.421 N.E.2d at 47.
.
3. Id. at 983, 421 N.E.2d at 42. See generally Massachusetts Depanment of Mental
Health Regulations, MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 104, § 3.01:I(a) (1979). The rule adopted a
definition of mental illness for use in civil commitment and criminal commitment pro
ceedings: "[A) substantial disorder of thought, mood. perception, orientation, or memory
which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality or ability to meet
the ordinary demands of life, but shall not include alcoholism." Id.
4. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 983, 421 N.E.2d at 42. In limiting its decision. the coun
declined "[t)o rule on the rights of patients confined against their will 10 State Hospitals
to refuse antipsychotic medication." Id. at 1021.421 N.E.2d at 62. By implication, the
decision of this coun applies to all individuals outside slate institutions. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § I (West Supp. 1982) (definition of mental health facility).
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201 (West 1958 & Supp. 1982).
6. Rogers v. Okin. 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361 n.1O (D. Mass. 1979), offd in pari, rer'd.
in pari, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. , Mills v. Rogers, 102
S. Ct. 2442 (1982) ("This term includes forced medication by injection and the threat
thereof, upon refusal to take medication orally").
7. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 n.1 (I st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub
nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
8. 1982 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1007,421 N.E.2d at 54. "The coun adopts the dictionary
version of 'emergency': An unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting
state that calls for immediate action. Webster's Third Nell: 1m'I. Dictionary at 741
(1961)". Id. at 1007,421 N.E.2d at 54.
The coun went on to narrow the definition as follows, "in determining whether an
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basically stated that absent the existence of an emergency, anti
psychotic medication may be administered forcibly to a noninstitu
tionalized ward only by court order, in' accordance with the
principles of substituted judgment.9
This note will analyze how the supreme judicial court in Roe
has expanded the substituted judgment doctrine to include decisions
to refuse extraordinary, that is, non-life-prolonging medical treat
ment. The note also will demonstrate Roe's significance in the con
text of the expanding rights of the legally incompetent in
Massachusetts.
II.

FACTS

When Richard Roe was seventeen or eighteen years of age, he
was involved in a minor accident while under the influence of alco
hol and marijuana. lo The automobile accident constituted a turning
point in Richard's life because he strongly rejected the use of illicit
drugs after this incident. I I In August of 1979, Richard was arrested
on a charge of receiving stolen property. Following his appearance
in court, Richard was committed for observation to Northampton
State Hospital because his competency to stand trial was ques
tioned. 12 During the observation, Richard refused all medication. 13
He was found competent to stand trial and released from the
emergency exists in tenns of requiring 'immediate action', the relevant time period to be
examined begins when.the claimed emergency arises, and ends when the individual who
seeks to act in the emergency could, with reasonable diligence, obtain judicial review of
his proposed actions. Id ai 1008,421 N.E.2d at 55.
g: Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), ajf'd in port, rev'd in port,
634 F.2d .650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct.
2442 (1982). The United States District Court in Rogers adopted a much clearer defini·
tion than Roe, "a committed mental patient may be forcibly medicated in an emergency
situation in .,.,hich a failure to do so .,.,ould result in a substantial likelihood of physico!.
harm. ... " 478 F. Supp. at 1365 (emphasis added).
9. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 999, 421 N.E.2d at 50·51. See infra notes 57·89 and
accompanying text.
The coun held that the guardian had not seasonably petitioned the probate
coun for the authority to consent to the administration of antipsychotic medica·
tion to the ward, Richard Roe, III, and thus vacated the probate coun's decree
granting the guardian such authority. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1022,421 N.E.2d
at 62.
10. Brief for Appellant at 6, In re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981,
421 N.E.2d 40 (Brief was unclear as to Richard's precise age on the date of the accident).
II. Id at 7. "Ever since the auto accident Richard Roe III has remained steadfast
in his opposition to drugs of any son." Id (emphasis added.)
12. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 15(b) (West Supp. 1982).
13. Brief for Appellant at 9. In re Guardianship of Roe. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981.
421 N.E.2d4O.
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hospital. 14
In February of 1980, Richard was arrested and charged with
attempted unarmed robbery and assault and battery.15 His compe
tence to stand trial was questioned again and Richard was commit
ted for observation and evaluation io Northampton state Hospital
for a second time. 16 During this observation and evaluation, Rich
ard was found to be incompetent to stand trial and committed for
further observation and treatment. 17 In April of 1980, the superin
tendent of Northampton State Hospital filed a petition for Richard's
civil commitment. ls At the hearing, Richard was found not civilly
committable. 19 During this period, Richard continued to refuse all
proferred medication. 20 His refusal of all antipsychotic medication
was based upon prior experiences with illicit drugs 21 as well as his
acceptance of certain tenets of the Christian Science faith. 22
14. Id. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § IS(b) (West Supp. 1982) (after a
finding of competency to stand trial, the patient is released to the court).
IS. Brief for Appellant at IO'/n re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh.o 981,
421.N.E.2d 40.
16. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 986, 421 N.E.2d at 44.
17. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(b) (West Supp. 1982).
18. Brief for Appellant at 10, In re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981,
421 N.E.2d 40. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, §§ 7-8 (West Supp. 1982). "The
superintendent of a facility may petition the district court . . . for the commitment to
said facility and retention of any patient at said facility whom paid superintendent deter
mines that the failure to hospitalize would create a likelihood of serious .harm by reason
of mental illness." Id. § 7(a). "Whenever a court receives a petition filed under any
provisions of this chapter for an .order of commitment of a person to a .facility . . . such
court shall notify the person, and pis nearest relative or guardian, or the receipt of such
petition and of the date a hearing on such petition is to be held. The hearing shall be
commenced within fourteen days of the filing of the petition unless a delay is requested
by the person or his counsel" Id. § 7{c). "After a hearing, . . . the district court shall not
order the commitment of a person at a facility . . . unless it finds after a hearing that
(1) such person is mentally ill, and (2) the discharge of such person from a facility would
create a likelihood of serious harm." Id. § 8{a)." The first order of commitment of a
person under this section shall be valid for a period of six months. . . ." Id § 8(d).
19. Brief for Appellant at IO,/n re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981,
421 N .E.2d 40.
20. Id. at 14.
21. See supra note II and accompanying text.
22. Brief fc' ~ .ppellant at 13-14, In re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. 981,
421 N .E.2d 40. Richard's primary religious affiliation is with the Unitarian Church;
however, during his secondperiod of observation at Northampton State Hospital, he ob
tained a copy of Health and Science, a book by Mary Baker Eddy, in French, which he
often referred 'to as "his Bible". Id. at 14. It should be noted, however. that in the pro
bate court's subsidiary findings, there was not evidence that Richard understood the con
text of the book. Appendix to Brief for Appellant at App. 26, In re Guardianship of Roe,
1981 Mass Adv. Sh. 981, 421 N.E.2d 40. (subsidiary finding of the court No. 39). See
general(y M. EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES (1875).
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In March of 1980, Richard's father filed a petition for appoint
ment as permanent guardian and a motion for temporary guardian
ship as well.2 3 Following a hearing on the motion, Richard was
found to be unable to care for himself by reason of mental illness
and in immediate need of a temporary guardian. 24 The father was
appointed temporary guardian and was granted the authority to con
sent to the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication, even
though his motion did not seek such authority.25 The court ap
pointedguardli7n adlilem,26 acting on behalf of Richard, filed a mo
tion to stay the decree authorizing administration of the
medication. 27 The motion was allowed for t~n days by the probate
judge and, at an appeals hearing before a single justice of the Massa
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court,28 the stay was continued pending
further review of the matter. 29 On July 30, 1980, the father was ap
pointed permanent guardian by the probate court. 30 In addition, the
probate court granted to the father authority to consent to the forci
ble administration of medication even though that authority was not
requested in the petition. 31
The permanent guardian's authority to consent to the adminis
tration of antipsychotic medication was stayed, however, under the
previous order of the single justice.32 Both parties filed a joint mo
23. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987, 421 N.E.2d at 44. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
201, §§ 6, 14 (West Supp. 1982).
24. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987, 421 N.E.2d at 44. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
201, § 14 (West Supp. 1982) (temporary guardian).
25. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987, 421 N.E.2d at 44.
26. Id See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 34 (West Supp. 1982) (the court
may, upon the representation of any party, including the court itself, appoint a guardian
ad litem). One of the problems with the Roe. case was that it failed to define the role of a
guardian ad litem in a substituted judgment proceeding. Traditionally, the guardian ad
litem assumed a non-adversarial role in guardianship litigation. Usually, he conducts an
investigation of the matter and based on his findings, makes a recommendation to the
court. In a Roe type case, however, where there is an important privacy interest being
protected, it would be important that the guardian ad hiem assume the role of an adver
sary. Otherwise it is possible that. the authority sought by the petitioner will be granted,
uncontested. if the guardian ad litem concludes that the authority is warranted. Contra In
re Mary Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 567, 432 N.E.2d 712, 721 (1982). See generally Baron,

Assuring "Detached by Passionate Investigation and Decision':' The Role of Guardian Ad
Lliem in rhe Saikewicz-Type Cases, 4 AM. 1.L. & MED. III (1978); Cramer, Roles ojthe
Guardian Ad Litem and Respondent's AI/orney, in MENTAL DISABILITIES-THE LEGAL
RESPONSE 37 (1979).
27. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987,421 N.E.2d at 44.
28. Id See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211. § 3 (West Supp. 1982).
29. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987, 421 N.E.2d at 44.
30. Id See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201. § 6 (West Supp. 1982).
31. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987. 421 N.E.2d at 44.
32. Id at 987-88, 421 N.E.2d at 44.
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tion on August 19, 1980, to transfer the case to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court. 33 The motion was granted and the case was
argued before the court on October 9, 1980. 34
In its opinion, the supreme judicial court affirmed the probate
court's decision to appoint Richard's father both temporary and per
manent guardian. 35 The court concluded, however, that the probate
judge had committed an error in granting the guardian authority to
consent to the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication
because the father had not filed a petition with the probate court
seeking an order directing that the medication be administered to the
ward. 36 Because no such request was before the probate judge, the
order authorizing consent to administer antipsyhotic medication was
.
premature and thus vacated by the supreme judicial court. 37 ·
Although the supreme judicial court could have disposed of the
case on the above conclusion, the court went qn to establish guide
lines for the making of a substituted judgment determination 38 re
garding the right to refuse antipsychotic medication, in an,ticipation
of future litigation. 39
III.
A.

HISTORY OF THE LAW

Massachusetts Law--Guardianship

1.

In General

Historically in Massachusetts, guardianship has been viewed as
a legal device to protect those individuals who are unable to care for
33. ld at 988, 421 N.E.2d at 44. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211, §§ 3, 4(a)
(West Supp. 1982).
34. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 981, 421 N.E.2d at 40. Two intervening parties submit
ted briefs in this opinion. On May 12, 1980, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office
moved to intervene on behalf of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health. On
September 9, 1980, Greater Boston Legal Services moved to intervene on behalf of the
named plaintiffs in Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aJTd in part, rev'd
in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102
S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
35. 1981 Mass. Ad\'. Sh. at 998, 421 N.E.2d at 50.
36. Id at 998-99, 421 N.E.2d at 50. The father had sought a contingent authority
to consent to the administration of antipsychotic medication if certain anticipated events
took place. ld
37. ld
38. ld See infra notes 57-89 and accompanying text.
39. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 999, 421 N.E.2d at 50. This opinion is not. however, an
advisory opinion of the supreme judicial court. MASS. Cm'ST. pI. 2, ch. 3, art. 2. amend.
art. 85. The guidelines set up by the supreme judicial court in Roe are not permissive but
mandatory.
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themselves. 40 In the case of an individual with mental illness, the
court, through authority granted by the legislature, "proceeded from
a position ofparens patriae and required only a finding that the 'best
interests' of the ward would be served by the appointment of a
guardian,"41 and that the alleged ward be mentally ill.42 Once the
guardianship had been granted, the guardian'S authority over the
mentally ill ward was limited only by the requirement that the
guardian act in the ward's best interests. 43
The trend in Massachusetts law over the past decade has been to
limit the authority of the guardian over the ward and to give the
ward self-authority consistent with his abilities. 44 Three recent Mas
sachusetts decisions have increased~significantly the due process pro
tection afforded mentally ill wards by narrowly defining the
standards required to establish a guardianship and limiting the dis
cretionary authority of the guardian.
The supreme judicial court decision, In re Bassell ,45 held that
the probate court has the statutory authority46 to tailor a guardian
ship both'by limiting the authority of the guardian and by allowing
the mentally ill ward to exercise the maximum amount of self-re
40. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) ("The whole theory of guardian
ships is to protect the ward during his incapacity to protect himself'). Id. at 643-44. See
generally Doe v. Doe, 377 Mass. 272, 273, 385 N.E.2d 995, 997(1979) (probate coun
found that the alleged ward was in need of a guardian because of his inability to care for
himself by reason of mental illness); Fazio v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 394, 403, 378 N.E.2d 951,
957 (1978) (an alleged ward will be in need of a guardianship when it is shown that the
alleged ward is unable to manage his own affairs by reason of mental illness); Guardian
ship of Bassett, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 60-61, 385 N.E.2d 1024, 1027-28 (1979)
(Belchenown State School Friends Association appointed to protect the welfare of the
ward).
41. Rogers, The COUrI's Consideration of Competence, in MENTAL DISABILITIES
THE LEGAL RESPONSE I (1979) (footnotes omitted). "[T]he State has a traditional power
and responsibility, under. the doctrine ofparens patriae to care for and protect the 'best
interests' of the incompetent person." Superintendent of Belchenown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977). See Rice v. Parkman, 16
Mass. 326, 328 (1820) (the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, through the legislature, acts
as the general guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act for themselves).
See generally MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. I, an. IV, § I.
42. See supra note 3.
43. See supra note 41.
44. Moriany, Guardianships of Mentally-III Persons: Recent Developments Re
viewed, 26 BOSTON B.J. 10 (1980).
45. 7 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 385 N.E.2d 1024 (1979).
46. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215; § 6 (West Supp. 1982) ("Probate couns shall
also have jurisdiction concurrent with the supreme judicial and superior couns, of all
cases and matters in which equitable relief is sought relative to ... (vi) all matters rela
tive to guardianship ...").
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sponsibility consistent with his abilities. 47 In an'other decision, Doe I'.
Doe ,48 the court held that for a guardian to admit or commit his
ward to a state mental health facility, there must be a separate hear~
ing on that matter. Before authority to commit will be granted, the
guardian must prove that the alleged ward meets the same criteria as
that needed to civilly commit an individual. 49 Finally, in Fazio v.
Fazio,5o the supreme judicial court held that a potential guardian
must establish the need for a guardianship by presenting evidence
that: (1) The alleged ward is mentally ill; and (2) by reason of
mental illness, the alleged ward is incapable of taking care of
himself. 51
Coinciding with these judicial developments has been a dra
matic increase in the number of guardianships granted in Massachu
setts. 52 The increase may be the result of a state policy toward
deinstitutionalization53 and h~s resulted in an influx to the commu
nity of individuals with mental illness, persons not totally able to

--------------------------------------------.------_._--
47. 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 62-64, 385 N.E.2d at 1029. The coun stated that there was
no conftict between the guardianship statute and the exercise of the probate coun's equi
table powers to limit guardianship authority to accommodate "a mentally retarded per
son who lacks decision-making capacity as to some but not all of his personal affairs."
Id at 63, 385 N.E.2d at 1029.
48. 377 Mass. 272, 385 N.E.2d 995 (1979).
49. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, §§ 6, 6A, 14 (West Supp. 1982) (as
amended by Act of Sept. 29,1977, ch. 567, § 1,1977 MASS. ACTS 712. which allowed a
coun order to admit or commit a mentally ill ward to a state facility. only if it was found
to be in the mentally ill ward's "best interests").
Under the Doe decision, the statute was interpreted to mean that a mentally ill ward
could no be admitted or committed to a state facility unless failure to admit or commit
would create a "likelihood of serious harm", the same 'standard used under the civil
commitment statute. 377 Mass. at 280, 385 N.E.2d iii 1000. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANl'.
ch. 123, §§ 1,7,8 (West Supp. 1982) (definition of likelihood of serious harm).
50. 375 Mass. 394, 378 N.E.2d 951 (1978).
51. Id at 403, 378 N.E.2d at 957 ("[W]e think it reasonable to interpret the statu
tory phrase 'incapable of taking care of himself by reason of mental illness' as encom'
passing a general inability on the part of an individual to manage his own personal and
financial affairs, such inability being caused by mental illness. We think the type of
evidence necessary to suppon such a finding, apartfrom evidence 0/ mental illness. should
consist of facts showing a proposed ward's inability to think or act for himself as to
matters concerning his person health, safety, and general welfare. or to make informed
decisions as to his propeny or financial interests"). (emphasis added). See MASS. GEl'.
LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 6 (West Supp. 1982).
.
52. The number of guardianships granted over the mentally disabled increased
from 516 in fiscal 1973, CHtEF JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURTS. STATISTICS AI'D RE
PORT OF THE PROBATE COURTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS FOR
YEAR 1973. at 9 (1974), to 1167 in fiscal year 1980, COMMONWEALTH REPORT OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT 1980. at 80. 83-84 (1981). an increase greater than IOQii(.
53. See MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH. THE FIVE YEAR
STATE PLAN FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES (1977).
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care for themselves. The difficulty with this trend is the maintenance
of proper supervision and care for these individuals. Unlike state
hospitals, maintenance in the community is more difficult because
the community lacks both the regimented lifestyle and physical
structure of an institution. For those individuals in need of care and
maintenance in the community, a guardianship provides a conve
nient tool for accomplishing that end. Because the authority granted
to a guardian is broad, the guardian is able to provide the necessary
structure in the patient's life outside the state hospital, 54 an ability
that may explain the increase in the number of granted
guardianships.
2.

Substituted Judgment

As the number of guardianships increase, however, the potential
for abuse of the authority granted guardians also increases. 55 A ma
jor area of potential abuse is the guardian's authority over the 'per
son' of the ward. 56 To deal with this problem, the supreme judicial
court has developed the doctrine of substituted judgment.
Briefly stated, a substituted judgment57 is the decision that
54. See supra notes 58, 59, 61 and accompanying text.
55. "There is an obvious need for broad, tlexible, and responsive guardianship
powers, but simultaneoulsy rhere is a need ro avoid rhe serious consequences accompanying
a wel/-inrenrioned bur mistaken exercise of those powers in making certain medical treat
ment decisions." 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1002,421 N.E.2d at 52 (emphasis added).
56. The authority to admit or commit a mentally ill ward was abused. The abuse
ultimately resulted in the passage of an amendment to the guardianship statute to rectify
the problem. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 6 (West Supp. 1982), as amended by Act
of Sept. 29, 1977, ch. 567 § I, 1977 MASS. ACTS 712. See Doe v. Doe, 377 Mass. 272, 385
N.E.2d 995 (1979). Another area of abuse is the right to refuse antipsychotic medication,
which was dealt with partially by the Roe decision. Roe, however, left unanswered the
question of whether a ward can be forcibly medicated without his consent in a state
hospital without the benefit of the substituted judgment determination. 1981 Mass. Adv.
Sh. at 1021,421 N.E.2d at 62. See Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982) (whether an
institutionalized ward has the right to refuse antipsychotic medication is a matter of state
law).
57. The substituted judgment doctrine originated in early 19th Century English
law. Ex parle Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (ch. 1816). Here, the court was concerned
about a family putting their own interests before those of the mentally ill ward in the
management of the latter's estate. Id. at 879. In its opinion, the court held that any
decision regarding the practice of making an allowance to the immediate relatives out of
the estate of the mentally ill ward should be made by the court in its discretion as the
mentally ill ward would have acted if of sound mind. Id. See also In re Darling, 39 Ch.
Div. 208, 213 (1888).
The issue of estate management and allowances being taken out of the mentally ill
ward's estate reached the United States Supreme Court in 1945. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594 (1945). In this case, the Court held that a court is to
substitute itself as nearly as possible for the ward, and to act upon the same motives and
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would be made by a legally incompetent individual if that individual
were competent. 58 The substituted judgment decision is actually
made by a probate court judge based on a number of factors, includ
ing the ward's stated preferences. 59
Three recent Massachusetts decisions, Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,60 In re Dinnerstein,61 and In
re Spring,62 have applied the substituted judgment doctrine to cases
of life-prolonging medical treatment. 63 In Saikewicz, the question
was whether to administer chemotherapy to a severely retarded
sixty-seven year old man suffering from leukemia. 64 The Superin
tendent of the Belchertown State School petitioned the probate court
for a guardian for the patient and moved to appoint a guardian ad
litem to make necessary treatment decisions about his leukemia. 65
The case presented a novel legal question for the supreme judicial
court, which set out three principle areas of inquiry:
considerations as she would have acted upon had she been competent to do so. Id at
599. The first case in the United States to apply the substituted judgment doctrine to a
matter relating to the guardian's authority over the person of a mentally ill ward oc
curred in Kentucky. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). The issue in that case
was whether the court had the power to permit the transplant of a kidney from a men
tally ill ward to the body of his brother. Id at 145. As part of its analysis, the court
determined that such power was granted to it under the substituted judgment doctrine.
Id at 148. Furthermore, "[t)he right to act for the incompetent in all cases has become
recognized as the doctrine of substituted judgment and is broad enough not only to cover
property but also to cover all mailers touching on the well being 01 the ward." Id (empha
sis added). The only flaw in the Strunk case is that the court did not sufficiently consider
the benefits to the mentally ill ward. Id at 151 (Steinfeld, J. dissenting).
58. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 999, 421 N.E.2d at 52.
59. Id at 1011-12,421 N.E.2d at 56-57.
60. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
61. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
62. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209,405 N.E.2d 115.
63. Id at 1219-20,405 N.E.2d at 122; 373 Mass. at 751,370 N.E.2d at 431; 6 Mass.
App. Ct. at 472-73,380 N.E.2d at 138. See Note, Right to Refuse M.edical Treatment
Decisions to Terminate Life-Prolonging Treatment lor Incompetent Patients-In re
Spring, 2 WEST. NEW ENG. L. REV. 759 (1980).
In cases involving minor incompetents, Massachusetts courts have applied what
amounts to a best interests test dressed in a substituted judgment's clothing. In other
words, a substituted judgment would not consider what the minor would do if compe
tent. Instead, the substituted judgment considers what is in the best interests of the in
competent minor regardless of the minor's personal preferences. Custody· of a Minor,
375 Mass. 733, 753, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (1978). See also Custody of a Minor, 385
Mass. 697, 711,434 N.E.2d 601, 609 (1982); Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732,745, 393
N.E.2d 836,844 (1979).
64. 373 Mass. at 729-30. 370 N.E.2d at 419. The patient, Joseph Saikewicz, had
been residing at the state school in Belchertown since 1928. Id at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
In 1976 he was diagnosed as suffering from leukemia. Id
65. Id at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
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The nature of the right of any person competent or incompe
tent to decline potentially life-prolonging treatment.
B. The legal standards that control the course of decision
whether or not potentially life-prolonging but not life saving
treatment would be administered to a person who is compe
tent to make the choice.
C. The procedure that must be followed in arriving at that
decision. 66

A.

With respect to the first and second inquiries, the court deter
mined that the ward's right to refuse chemotherapy was a fundamen
tal right of privacy; a right that must be weighed against the
appropriate state interests. 67 With respect to the third inquiry, con
cerning the mechanics of articulating the determined right under the
first and second inquiries in order to determine the choice that the
ward would make, the court applied the substituted judgment doc
trine. 68 As part of the substituted judgment procedure, the court
held that such decisions are to be made through judicial resolu
tions. 69 In reaching such judicial resolution, the court balanced nine
factors that were either for or against treatment1° against certain
countervailing state interests. 71 In arriving at a substituted judg
ment, of the nine factors considered,72 the expressed interests and
preferences of the ward were given the greatest weight. 73
In Dinnerslein, the mentally ill ward was a sixty-seven year old
woman suffering from the advanced stages of Alzheimer's Disease, a
66. Id. at 736, 370 N.E.2d at 422-23. The nature of this right includes a serious
look at what are the mentally ill ward's best interests in each situation, id. at 737, 370
N.E.2d at 423, an implicit recognition by the state "that a person has a strong interest in
being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity.", id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at
424, which must be weighed against the following state interests: I) the preservation of
life, 2) the protection of innocent third panies; 3) the prevention of suicide and 4) main
taining the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
Also, "The 'substituted judgement' standard which has been described commends
itself simply because of its straightforward respect for the integrity and autonomy of the
individual." Id. at 75 I, 370 N.E.2d at 43 \.
Finally, in situations where life-prolonging treatment is needed, it is appropriate for
a guardian to petition the probate coun for such an order. Id. at 756, 370 N.E.2d at 433.
A guardian ad litem is generally appointed to conduct a thorough investigation of the
matter. Id. at 757, 370 N.E.2d at 433, and the judge shall make a decision applying the
facts of the investigation to a substituted judgment. Id. at 757, 370 N.E.2d at 434.
67. Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
68. Id. at 751, 370 N.E.2d at 43\.
69. Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
70. Id. at 752-54, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32.
71. Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
72. Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 43 \.
73. Id.
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form of senility.74 She was in a vegetative state,75 with no hope of
recovery and a life expectancy of appropriately one year. 76 Here, the
court ended its inqu.iry at steps A and B of the Saikewicz analysis,
having found that judicial resolution was unnecessary under the in
stant facts.
In its analysis, the court stated that "[p]rolongation of life as
used in the Saikewicz case does not mean a mere suspension of the
act of dying, but contemplates at the very least, a remission of symp
toms enabling a return towards a normal functioning, integrated
existence."77 The court held that the "question is n6t one for judicial
decision, but one for attending physician"78 because the "case [did]
not . . . present the type of significant treatment choice or election
[as in Sallcewlcz] which, in light of sound medical advice, is to be
made by the patient, if competent to do SO."79
In Spring, the issue was whether a guardian had the right to
terminate hemodialyis, a kidney treatment, for the mentally ill ward;
a seventy-eight year old man suffering. from kidney disease. so The
ward also suffered. from chronic organic brain syndrome, a form of
senility.sl Both conditions were considered permanent and irrevers
ible. s2 The court found that the facts and legal principles involved
were similar to Saikewicz. 83 In its analysis, the court enunciated
fifteen factors that were to be considered in making a substituted
judgment. 84 The court, however, gave no relative weight to any of
the factors. 85 The court affirmed the need of a court order in situa
tion of life-prolonging treatment and required the application of
substituted judgment to situations86 involving life-prolonging medi
74. 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 466-67, 380 N.E.2d iii 134-35.
75. Id at 467, 380 N.E.2d at 135.
76. Id at 468, 380 N.E.2d at 135. It was the physician's recommendation "[t]hat
when (and if) cardiac or respiratory arrest occurs, resuscitation effons should not be un
denaken." Id .
77. Id at 472-73, 380 N.E.2d at 138.
78. Id at 475, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
79. Id at 474, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
80. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1211-12,405 N.E.2d at 118.
81. Id at 1212,405 N.E.2d at 118.
82. Id
83. Id at 1216,405 N.E.2d at 120.
84. Id at 1216-17, 405 N.E.2d at 121.
85. In the end, however, the coun appeared more concerned, in coming to its sub
stituted judgment, with the immediate suffering of the ward and his uncooperativeness in
the administration of the treatment. Id at 1220,405 N.E.2d at 122. Neither of the above
two factors were expressly enunciated as one of the fifteen factors set out by the coun
earlier in the opinion. See Id at 1216-17,405 N.E.2d at 121.
86. Id at 1214.405 N.E.2d at 119.
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cal treatment where the chance of remission exists.
Saikewicz, ,Dinnerstein, and Spring recognized the possible need
to adjudicate the rights of mentally ill or retarded wards with respect
to life-prolonging treatment. 87 The decisions also noted that the in
trusive nature of life-prolonging treatment infringes upon the right
of privacy of mentally ill or retarded wards,88 and that the facts of
Saikewicz and Spring give rise to a need for application of substi
tuted judgment, which must be balanced against countervailing state
interests. 89
B.

The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication

Parens patriae 90 may also be exercised by the state to protect
those individuals with mental illness who are unable to care for
themselves, although they may be legally competent. 91 This inherent
state authority is effectuated primarily through the civil commitment
statute. 92
. In recent years, the doctrine ofparens patriae has been limited
in the mental health setting by the least restrictive alternative doc
trine: "In essence, . . . the least restrictive alternative doctrine
means that if there are a number of equally effective means of
87. See supra notes 60-86 and accompanying text.
88. "The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of the
sanctity of individual free choice and self determination as fundamental constituents of
life." 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426. Although the court professes that this is a
state constitutional right of privacy, it relies heavily on the common law tort doctrine that
a person has a strong interest in being free from the nonconsensual invasion of his bodily
integrity, id at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424, and the federal constitutional right of privacy
established in Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), to establish the above described right of privacy under Massachusetts law. See
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1000 n.9, 421 N.E.2d at 51 n.9.
89. It is interesting to note that Massachusetts has a body of unreported case law
dealing with the state statutes concerning minor incompetents, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 201, §§ 2, 3, 4,5 (West Supp. 1981) (minor incompetents), and their right as donors to
refuse organ and tissue donation, Baron, Botsford & Cole, Life Organ and Tissue Trans
plants from Minor J)onor in Massachusells, 55 B. U.L. Rev. 159 (1975). an intrusive medi
cal procedure dealt with in the Strunk case, see supra note 157. The pattern of these
cases is that the courts have only applied the "substituted judgment" doctrine once. Rap
paport v. Stott, No. 574-57 (Mass. Aug. 28, 1974), and in all instances the transplants
have been allowed, Baron, Botsford & Cole, supra, at 162. Why the Massachusetts courts
have dealt so disparately with such analogous areas of guardianship law is unknown. It
does, however, raise an interesting equal protection question as to why some incompe
tents are afforded greater rights than other incompetents in significantly similar situa
tions. See supra note 63.
90. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
91. See Custer, The Origins ofthe J)octrine of "Parens Palr/oe", 27 EMORY L.J. 195
(1978).
92. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 (West Supp. 1982).

1983)

MASSACHUSE1TS LAW

577

achieving the same ends, the solution which allows the greatest de
gree of fundamental liberty should be chosen."93 The major thrust of
the doctrine in mental health law94 is to avoid unwarranted depriva
tion of liberty95 through civil commitment to a state hospital.
The competing interests of parens patriae and the least restric
tive alternative doctrine present a difficult problem in determining a
mentally ill individual's right' to refuse antipsychotic medication. 96
Unlike confinement involved in civil commitment, which is a physi
cal restraint, the administration of antipsychotic medication is a
chemical restraint. 97 In an action to civilly commit a mentally ill
individual, certain procedural due process steps must be taken to
avoid an unnecessary loss of liberty.98
A loss of liberty, however, also accompanies the use of chemical
restraints. In Rogers v. Okin ,99 the Federal District Court for the
District of Massachusetts held that, absent an emergency, an individ
ual with mental illness has a constitutionally protected right to refuse
the forced administration of antipsychotic medication as guaranteed
by the·right of privacyJ()() and the first amendment freedom of ex
pression. IOI Rogers was reversed in part by the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit. There, the court held that individu
als with mental illness do not have an absolute right to refuse antip
93. MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL ADVISORS COMMITTEE, MANUAL FOR MENTAL DIS
ABILITIES PROFESSIONALS, pan V, app. F (1977). See Chambers, Allernalives 10 Chil
Commilmenl of Ihe Menla/~v III,' Praclkal Guides 'and Conslilulional Imperalives. 70
MICH. L REV. 1107, 1145 (1971-72).
94. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C Cir. 1969).
95. la
96. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123. § I (West Supp. 1982) (definition of
restraints ).
97. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1018.421 N.E.2d at 60.
98. See supra note 18.
99. 478 F.Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in pari, rev'd in parI, 634 F.2d 650 (1st
CiT. 1980), vacared and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (l982).
100. la at. 1365-66.
101. la at 1366-67. Cf Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 942 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(the opinion of the coun stated a preference for resting its holding of an individual's right
to refuse antipsychotic medication on a founeenth amendment due process argument
rather than a first amendment freedom of expression argument); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.
Supp. i 131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) (the opinion held that a temporary dulling of the senses
through the administration of antipsychotic medication does not rise to a first amend
ment freedom of expression violation), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
This novel approach of assening the individual's right to refuse antipsychotic medi
cation through the first amendment right of freedom of expression responds to the new
technologies of behavior control such as antipsychotic medication, psychosurgery, and
electro-convulsive shock treatment (ECT). Rhoden. The RighI ro Rifuse Psycholropic
Drugs. 15 HARV. CR.-CL L REV. 363, 389 (1980).
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sychotic medication. 102 Instead, the right to refuse antipsychotic
medication must be balanced against competing state interests
through a procedure that incorporates a mentally ill patient's due
process rights. 103 Both opinions agree that the use of antipsychotic
medication on unwilling mentally ill patients is an intrusion upon
the individual's bodily integrity because of the mind altering effects
and the potentially harmful side effects of chemical restraints. 104
The Supreme Court later vacated the decision of the appeals court,
stating that the right to refuse antipsychotic medication should be
based on state law.IO S Pending a final decision by the court of ap
peals, the decision of the federal district court was reinstated.
IV.

ANALYSIS

One possible option for the supreme judicial court in R.oe was to
hold simply that the authorization granted by the probate judge, al
lowing the guardian to consent to the administration of antipsychotic
medication, was in error because such authorization was not season
ably requested. Yet foreseeing the probability of future litigation
and thus the need to clarify the guidelines set out in Saikewicz and
Spring, the supreme judicial court in Roe went on to extend the doc
trine of substituted judgment to include not only life-prolonging
medical treatment lO6 but also "extraordinary medical treatment."I07
Specifically, the court recognized the right of a noninstitutional
ized 108 mentally ill ward to a judicial determination 109 with respect
to the acceptance or rejection of antipsychotic medication by his
guardian. I 10
Although previous Massachusetts decisions have utilized substi
102. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1980), vacaled and remanded
sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
\03. Id at 656. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 942 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(the opinion of the court adopts a fourteenth amendment procedural due process argu
ment to detennine an individual's right to refuse antipsychotic medication).
104. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1359 (D. Mass. 1979), alfd in parr. rev't/ in
part, 634 F .2d 650, 653 (1 st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers,
102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
105. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982). The Court relied heavily on the Roe'
opinion in arriving at its holding. Id at 2452. Roe, therefore, will have a significant
impact on how the appeals court decides the issues in Rogers. See id
106. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
107. 1981 Mass. Adv Sh. at 1001, 421 N.E.2d at 51.
108. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
109. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 983, 421 N.E.2d at 42.
110. Id at 999, 421 N.E.2d at 50.
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tuted judgment only in those cases with life-prolonging treatment, III
the supreme judicial court found, in the analyses of Saikewicz and
Spring, that mentally ill wards have an interest in being free from
the intrusion of certain extraordinary medical treatmenis. 112 The
court also relied heavily on the analysis of Rogers and found that th~
mind controlling effects of antipsychotic medication fall into the cat
egory of intrusive medical treatment. I 13 The court in Roe concurred
with the finding in Rogers that a mentally ill ward's right to refuse
antipsychotic medication is part of the right of privacy covered by
the Massachusetts Constitution. 114
A.

The Decision to Administer Antipsychotic Medication: The
Needjor Judicial Resolution

The court identified five factors to be considered when deciding
the appropriateness of a court order to administer antipsychotic
medication: "( I) [T]he intrusiveness of the proposed treatment,
(2) the possibility of adverse side effects, (3) the absence of an emer
gency, (4) the nature and extent of prior judicial involvement, and
(5) the likelihood ofconfiicting interests." I 15 According to the court,
the intrusiveness of the proposed treatment has several variables:
First is whether the drug has a low predictability rate; 116 second is
whether the drug can immobilize both mind and body; I nand third,
is whether the drug can be therapeutically abused. In the instant
case, the court found that. the antipsychotic medication, Haldol,
could effect a person for up to fourteen days. I IS These facts con
vinced the court that the treatment was highly intrusive.
III. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanymg text.
112. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1000-01. 421 N.E.2d at 51. The supreme judicial court
may have been better advised to use the term "intrusive medical treatment" rather'than
"extraordinary medical treatment". The latter term generally refers to two types of treat~
ment: I) experimental treatment, where the goal is furthering the knowledge of medical
science rather than the treatment of the patient and 2) non-validated treatment, where
the goal is treating the patient using, however, a drug or technique, which is not known
or proven to be of any value.
It is arguable that antipsychotic medication falls in the latter category and thus ex
traordinary medical treatment is not a misnomer in Roe. The term "intrusive medical
treatment" would be a more accurate term for the purpose of applying the substituted
judgment doctrine to future cases where the medical treatments are neither experimental
nor non-validated.
113. Id
114. Id at 1000 n.9, 421 N.E.2d at 51 n.9.
115. Id at 1002, 421 N.E.2d at 52.
116. Id at 1003-05,421 N.E.2d aJ 53.
117. Id
118. Id at 1003,421 N.E.2d at 52-53.
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The second factor, the possibility of adverse side effects, focuses
on the variety of potential physical side effects that accompany the
administration of antipsychotic medication.' The Roe court de
scribed in fairly specific detail the "grotesque" side effects that may
result from the administration of Haldol. I19 The court balanced the
intended effects of antipsychotic medication against their harmful
side effects as an objective measure of how the incompetent ward
might make his decision under such circumstances. 120
The third factor is the absence of an emergency. The Roe court
adopted the dictionary definition of an emergency, that is, a set of
unforeseen circumstances calling for immediate action. 121 The court
went on to note that the facts of the instant case did not fall within
this definition. The ward's condition might deteriorate, but only
over "[a]n uncertain but relatively distant ..." time. 122
The fourth factor, the nature and extent of prior judicial in
volvement, considers whether a mentally ill individual has had any
prior judicial determinations regarding his competency to refuse an
tipsychotic medication. 12l With respect to this factor, the Roe court
found that the facts of the instant case did not reveal evidence of a
prior determination made on behalf of the ward.
The final factor, the likelihood of conflicting interests, considers
interests of a guardian that may conflict with' the mentally ill ward's
best interests. 124 Richard's father, as guardian, might have family
interests that would compete with Richard's interests as an individ
ual. I25 The cOurt, in such instances, is better able to render an unbi
ased and objective decision. 126
The above five factors will vary according to the facts and cir
cumstances of each decision. 127 Even the supreme judicial court in
dicated that the factors are not exhaustive. 128 The factors delineated,
however, do provide a more manageable framework than previous
119. Id at 1005,421 N.E.2d at 53-54 (the side effects included dystonic reactions
akathasia, Parkinsonisms, low blood pressure, depression, and weight gain).
120. Id
121. Id at 1007,421 N.E.2d at 54 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD INT'L DICTIONARY
741 (1961» "We accept the dictionary definition of 'emergency': 'an unforeseen combi
nation of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action' "). See
supra note 8.
122. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1007,421 N.E.2d at 54.
123. Id at 1009,421 N.E.2d at 56.
124. Id
125. See infra note 141.
126. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1010,421 N.E.2d at 56.
127. Id at 1002,421 N.E.2d at 52.
128. Id
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Massachusetts cases from which to decide whether court interven
tion is necessary to protect a ward from the administration of antip
sychotic medication. 129

B.

The Substituted Judgment Determination

If a court order to administer antipsychotic medication is deter
mined to be required, then the supreme judicial court has identified
six factors to be considered by the probate court in making a substi
tuted judgment determination. 130 The relevant factors are:
"(1) [T]he ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment; (2) his
religious beliefs; (3) the impact upon the ward's family; (4) the
probability of adverse side effects; (5) the consequences if treatment
is refused; and (6) the prognosis with treatment."131
The first factor, the mentally ill ward's expressed preferences re
garding treatment, is entitled to much weight in making a substituted
judgment because this factor finds strong support in Massachusetts
case law 132 as well as in the facts of the instant case. The ward had
expressed several times while legally competent that he did not wish
to take antipsychotic medication. 133 The court noted that even in
situations where an individual had been found legally incompetent
and in need of a guardian, a court should still give serious considera
tion to the mentally ill ward's expressed preferences. 134 Thus, the
fact that the word had steadfastly rejected antipsychotic medication
before and after he was adjudged legally incompetent was to figure
highly in the court's decision.
The second factor, religious beliefs, are accorded weight equal
to the "[t]enacity with which an individual may adhere to his reli
gious beliefs."135 In determining the validity of a person's beliefs, the
supreme judicial court adopted the three factors set out by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of In re Boyd: 136
[W)betber the objection, if religious, is a recognizable, estab
See supra notes 70, 84 and accompanying text.
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1011,421 N.E.2d at 56.
131. Id. at 1011-12.421 N.E.2d at 57.
132. See 377 Mass. at 279, 385 N.E.2d at 1000. "Although [the ward] failed to
understand his mental condition and hisneed for treatment, we think his stated prefer
ence must be treated as a critical factor in the determination of his 'best interests'." Id.
See also Allis v. Morton, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 63, 64 (1855) (in determining the need for
guardianship. the happiness of the wiud should be considered).
133. See supra notes 13. 20-22 and accompanying text.
134. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1012,421 N.E.2d at 57.
135. Id. at 1013,421 N.E.2d at 57.
136. 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979).
129.

130.
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lished one, such as the well-known views of a Jehovah's Witness
of Christian Scientist; whether the individual has acted upon these
views in ways that demonstrate they have been deeply felt; and
whether these views have been long held, perhaps as a matter of
family tradition, or if more recently adopted, have been the result
of demonstrable experience, such as a religious conversion, which
would justify a court's conclusion that the views are
unequivocal. 137

In the instant case, the ward's adherence to the tenets of Chris
tian Science was based on a book that the probate court found he
could not understand. 138 His objection to medication, based on reli
gious grounds, did not hold great significance under the instant
circumstances.
The third factor recognized the "desire to minimize the burden
on ... [the mentally ill ward's] family, ..."139 particularly in terms
of financial and emotional stress. The court considered the manner
in which a legally competent individual would weigh the concerns in
making a decision about treatment with antipsychotic medication,
although the court was unclear as to how the ward's expressed pref
erences would effect his family financially and emotionally; 140 nor
did the opinion of the court indicate how much weight this factor
was accorded in the instant case. 141
The fourth factor, the probability of adverse side effects, relates
to "the severity of these side effects, the probability that they would
occur, and the circumstances in which they would be endured."142
Grotesque side effects, such as tardive dyskinesia, were. described
earlier in the opinion. 143 In the instant case, Richard would have
been required to endure the mind altering effects of one injection of
Haldol, which could last up to fourteen days.l44 This factor figured
prominently in the Roe court's decision.
The fifth factor, the consequences of refused treatment, pertains
137. ld at 752.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
139. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1013,421 N.E.2d at 58.
140. Id at 1013,421 N.E.2d at 58.
141. The court may have concluded, without stating so in the opinion, that the
ward may not have considered this factor if competent. See id at 1013,421 N.E.2d at 58.
On the other hand, the court may have ignored this factor as to the facts of Roe
because of the family problems caused by the ward's illnes. Appendix to Brief for Appel
lant at App. 24, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981) (subsidiary findings of the
probate court 15-19).
142. Id at 1014,421 N.E.2d at 58.
143. Id at 1005-07, 421 N.E.2d at 53-54. See supra note 119.
144. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
138.
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to the choice that a legally competent individual would make if he
were to balance the irreversible deterioration ultimately occurring
without treatment against the favorable prognosis resulting from
proper treatment. 145 The court found the effect of the ward's refusal
to take antipsychotic medication could not be conclusively estab
lished and instead lead to speculative conclusions as to both deterio
ration andirreversibility.I 46
.
The sixth factor, the prognosis with treatment, considers the
"general proposition that the greater the likelihood that there will be
cure or improvement, the more likely an individual would be to sub
mit to intrusive treatment accompanied by the possibility of adverse
side effects."147 Under this consideration, it is the responsibility of
the judge to determine the effects of the drug treatment and the·
probability that the mentally ill ward will be benefited. 148 In Roe, the
supreme judicial court discussed the unpredictable nature of antip
sychotic medication and thus the uncertainty of whether the ward
would benefit from such treatment. 149
The list of factors above, to be considered in making a substi
tuted judgment determination, provides a manageable framework
that will assist probate court judges in making appropriate and con
sistent decisions concerning the use of antipsychotic medication on
mentally ill wards. If the substituted judgment determination is that
the mentally ill ward would not take antipsychotic medication, the
court must weigh that decision against the appropriate state inter
ests. 150 The supreme judicial court relied on Saikewicz for those
state interests that might override a substituted judgment that the
ward, if competent, would not take the medication.I 51 They are
"( I) [T]he preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of
innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide, and (4) main
taining the ethical integrity of the medical profession."152 The sec
ond state interest was pertinent because of the ward's history of
violence toward individuals in the community.1S3 For the state inter
est to override a mentally ill ward's substituted judgment to refuse
antipsychotic medication, the likelihood of serious harm to third
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

150.
lSI.
152.
153.

1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1014,421 N.E.2d at 58.
at 1O.J7, 421 N.E.2d at 54.
at 1015,421 N.E.2d at 585-9 (footnote omitted).
at 1015,421 N.E.2d at 59.
at 1003-4,421 N.E.2d at 53.
at 1016.421 N.E.2d at 59.
See 373 Mass. at 741,370 N.E.2d at 425.
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1016,421 N.E.2d at 59.
fd. at 1017-18.421 N.E.2d at 60.
fd.
fd.
fd.
fd.
fd.
fd.
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parties must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ls4
Finally, should the state meet the preceding standard, the Roe
court concluded that the state has two means of protecting its inter
ests: involuntary commitment to a state facility or forced adminis
tration of antipsychotic medication. ISS To determine which is
appropriate, the judge must decide through an "extended substituted
judgment" the alternative that serves as a lesser intrusive means of
restraint and, as well, provides adequate protection to the public. ls6
The court's finding was particularly significant because its analysis
includes the idea that civil commitment and involuntary administra
tion of antipsychotic medication equally infringe on the same per
sonal liberties. ls7 The decision strongly suggested that, in
Massachusetts, the administration of antipsychotic medication
should no longer be considered a less restrictive form of restraint
than physical restraint. IS8
In sum, the supreme judicial court has arrived at a set of guide
lines to: (1) determine if a court order is needed; (2) make the substi
tuted judgment if step one is answered in the affirmative; and
(3) determine if the countervailing state interests could override that
substituted judgment. Particular attention must be given to the in
trusiveness of antipsychotic medication and whether adequate treat
ment could be achieved through less restrictive means.
In Roe, the supreme judicial court limited the use of these
guidelines to cases involving noninstitutionalized mentally ill wards
whose guardians wish to consent to the administration of antip
sychotic medication. ls9
V.

THE IMPACT OF ROE: INCREASING RIGHTS OF LEG ALLY
INCOMPETENT IN MASSACHUSETTS

Roe is a pivotal casein the area of substituted judgment. 160 Pre
vious decisions have considered the application of the doctrine 161
154. Id at 1018,421 N.E.2d at 60. See Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v.
Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 275-77, 372 N.E.2d 242,245-46 (1978).
155. Id at 1019,421 N.E.2d at 6J.
156. Id
157. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1018,421 N.E.2d at 60.
158. Taken further, the decision could also imply that a guardian could seek the
authority to commit to a state facility or the authority to consent to the administration of
antipsychotic medication, but not both. See id
159. Id at 102-022. 421 N.E.2d at 61-62.
160. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 60-89 and accompanying text.
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only to life-prolonging treatment. 162 Roe, however, has expanded the
doctrine to include extraordinary medical treatment, a much broader
category than life-prolonging treatment. 163 Although the supreme ju
dicial court limited the extraordinary medical treatment category,
for the present, to the use of antipsychotic medication, it did so only
because of the difficulties in formulating a definitive set of guidelines
to deal with the entire spectrum of medical treatment, as well as the
diverse circumstances under which treatment could be delivered. l64
The generalized category of extraordinary medical treatment, com
bined with the Roe court's analysis and sweeping language 16S sug
gests, however, that the supreme judicial court is breaking ground
for use of the substituted judgment doctrine beyond the category of
antipsychotic medication. 166 Any type of medical treatment that ar
guably is intrusive upon the ward's right of privacy in the integrity of
his body could be litigated under the substituted judgment doctrine.
This category could include, not only dangerous and irreversible
medical procedures such as sterilization,167 organ transplants, or
electo-convulsive shock treatment, but also such routine medical
procedures as tooth extractions or appendectomies. Indeed, the lan
162. See JUpra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
163. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1000-01,421 N.E.2d at 51.
164. Id. at \022,421 N.E.2d at 62.
165. Note in the outline of the court's guidelines below that the language of each of
the headings and subheadings avoid any reference to antipsychotic medication or treat
ment. In fact they make no reference to an)' specific type of medical treatment.
Outline
A. Need for a Court Order.
(I) The intrusiveness of the proposed treatment.
(2) The possibility of adverse side effects.
(3) The absence of an emergency.
(4) The nature and extent of prior judicial involvement.
(5) The likelihood of confiicting interests.
B. Relevant Factors in the Substituted Judgment Determination.
(I) The ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment.
(2) The ward's religious beliefs.
(3) The impact upon the ward's family.
(4) The probability of adverse side effects.
(5) The consequences if treatment is refused.
(6) The prognosis with treatment.
C. The Accommodation of Overriding State Interests.
Id. at 1000·16,421 NE.2d at 51-59.
166. See JUpro notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
167. In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555,432, N.E.2d 712 (1982). "[Sjterilization is an ex
traordinary and highly intrusive form of medical treatment that irreversibly extinguishes
the ward's fundamental right of procreative choice, we conclude that a guardian must
obtain a proper judicial order for the procedure before he or she can validly consent to
it." Id. at 539, 432 N.E.2d at 716-17.
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guage of Roe is flexible enough to afford the application of substi
tuted judgment to the everchanging technologies of medical science.
Roe also provides a manageable procedural framework by
which probate court judges may reach accurate and consistent deci
sions involving the substituted judgment doctrine. 168 At the same
time, these guidelines are not exhaustive and a probate judge may
exercise his discretion where the facts of a particular case require a
different analysis. 169 As a practical matter, the guidelines established
by the supreme judicial court may discourage guardians from indis
criminately seeking the authority to consent to the administration of
antipsychotic medication because of the time and expense necessary
to obtain a judicial order. The result would at least force potential
guardians to seek out less restrictive means of treating individuals
with mental illness.
Although the supreme judicial court has determined that a right
of privacy exists in a person resisting intrusion upon the integrity of
his body, 170 Roe was the first case to apply the right of privacy to a
ward's right to refuse antipsychotic medication. l7l Mentally ill
wards now have the same right to refuse antipsychotic medication as
individuals not under guardianship. 172 The difference is how the in
dividual expresses his right to refuse antipsychotic medication: the
legally competent individual expresses the right himself, while the
ward's right is expressed through a probate judge. The new guide
lines upon which the probate judge's decision must be based effectu
ate the expanded proteCtion of the ward's right of privacy. 173 The
Roe opinion, therefore,' has worked to close the gap between guardi
anship law and mental health law in the State of Massachusetts. 174
The decision will result in more equalized treatment between those
individuals with mental illness not under guardianship and those
who are under guardianship. Both groups are entitled to mental
health treatment under the least restrictive means. 17S The Roe deci
sion guarantees that although the ward cannot make the decision
himself, his right to refuse antipsychotic medication will be respected
through a rigorous court procedure, much the same as a person who
168.
169.
170.
17!.
172.
173.
174.
175.

1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1011,21 N.E.2d at 56.
Id. al 1002, 1011,421 N.E.2d at 52, 56.
See supra note 88.
Id. at 999, 421 N.E.2d at 50.
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1000,421 N.E.2d at 51.
Id. at 1000-01,421 N.E.2d at 51.
Id. at 1019,421 N.E.2d at 61.
See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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is not under guardianship. This preserves the same right the ward
would have had if he had been legally competent, as nearly as
possible.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Prior to Roe, the substituted judgment doctrine was confined to
life-prolonging medical treatment and the standards used for reach
ing that judgment were unclear. Roe expanded the doctrine to in
clude "extraordinary" medical treatment, specifically addressing the
issues involved in the administration of antipsychotic medication.
Although the court limited its decision to the facts of Roe, the lan
guage of the opinion gives the court carte blanche to apply the sub
stituted judgment doctrine to both known and unknown medical
treatments when the right factors present themselves. Additionally,
the language of the opinion helps to close the gap between guardian
ship law and mental health law by recognizing the need to afford
mentally ill wards the same rights and privileges that are granted to
those mentally ill individuals not under guardianship.
Finally, the supreme judicial court has recognized the intrusive
nature of antipsychotic medication with respect to the integrity of an
individual's mind and body. The opinion is a strong statement
against the use of antipsychotic medication as a less intrusive means
of treatment than physical restraint and a strong statement concern
ing the right of every individual to have a choice in preserving the
integrity of his body.
Michael J. Stebbins

